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cision in R. v. N.S. as a case study, and it sits in con-
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theorists, particularly the recent work of Patricia Hill
Collins (2017) that builds on Nira Yuval-Davis
(1997) and others, to argue that political action is
most effective when transversal practice is layered
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to effective transversalism (2017, 1471 ) , transversal
feminist praxis can be found in examples of everyday
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Introduction: Praxis and Postmodern
Transversal Politics
Feminist praxis is usually a conscious, reflexive, pro-
cess of moving from theory to application in order to
create transformations (see, for example, Allen 2000;
Archer Mann 2012; Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall
2013; De Reus, Few, and Balter Blume 2005; Evans
2016; Hesse-Biber 2012; Naples 2013; and Sharp et
al. 2017) . We want to expand the scope of feminist
praxis, however, to include moments in which femin-
ist theory explains political transformations that may
not be deliberate, but that result in a feminist out-
come: the pursuit of gender equality through personal
and political transformation. Finding these moments
is important at a time when, politically, it seems that
anti-equality movements are gaining ground. This
paper uses a dataset of online comments generated
after the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v.
N.S. as a case study. It sits in conversation with post-
modern and transversal feminist theorists, particularly
the recent work of Patricia Hill Collins (2017) that
builds upon the previous work of Nira Yuval-Davis
(1997) and others, to argue that political action is
most effective when transversal practice is layered
onto intersectional politics. Further, we argue that
despite Hill Collins’ concern that political practice has
yet to move to effective transversalism (2017, 1471 ) ,
transversal feminist praxis can be found in examples
of everyday politics which offer hope for social trans-
formation.
Postmodern and transversal feminist theories explain
people’s political transformations. In the current anti-
intellectual political climate, we want to illustrate how
layering theory onto everyday political transforma-
tions reveals that transformative praxis can be found
around us, even when it is not consciously deliberate.
That is, transversal and postmodern feminist theories,
which challenge the false binaries that divide people
into oppositional political positions, do not just ex-
plain the roots of gender inequality but also illumin-
ate the pathways to politics that can be identified as
feminist in their outcomes (see, for example, Kolmar
and Bartkowski 2010, 2-6; and Lorber 2012) .
Postmodern feminist praxis challenges rigid identity
boundaries between “self” and “other,” nationally and
individually, and produces points of connection
across identity groups. It “undermines foundational
categories by insisting that bodies, identities, and
statuses are contingent—time-bound, situational, and
culturally shaped” (Lorber 2012, 285) . Feminist
postmodern theorists argue that the sex-gender binary
is a false construct produced by cultural beliefs and
practices at particular moments in time and place.
The intersectional postmodern approach extends the
binary beyond sex-gender to multiple categories, al-
lowing analysis along different valences to undermine
fixed binaries like “Black/White,” “gay/straight,”
“abled/disabled,” “young/old,” etc.
Transversal feminist praxis developed during the same
period as postmodern feminism in the late twentieth
century and emerged from coalition-building groups
where women worked “not just with different others
but with … enemies” (Bastian 2006, 1039; also see
Cockburn 1998; Yuval-Davis 1994, 179-197; and
Yuval-Davis 1997) . Transversal feminism recognizes
that “politics based on a homogenous notion of iden-
tity is spectacularly unable to deal with the problem
of working toward peace” (Bastian 2006, 1039) . In-
stead, the theory argues that “by questioning how one
understands one’s sense of identity, by reducing de-
fensive reactions and attempting to broaden one’s
point of view, less aggressive responses to conflict can
become more than a naïve hope” (Bastian 2006,
1039) . The processes of opening up identity to en-
gage fluidly with similarity in others is embedded in
postmodern feminism, and transversal processes
based on shifting one’s identity position diffused
many arguments in our dataset, in part because
transversal praxis allowed people to “keep one’s own
perspective on things while empathizing and respect-
ing others” (Yuval-Davis 1994, 193) .
Methods
We explore possibilities for transformation using the
online comments that appeared after the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision on women’s right to veil
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in the courtroom in R. v. N.S, as a case study. The
Canadian Supreme Court case R. v. N.S. considered
the right of a Muslim woman to wear a niqab while
testifying as a victim in a sexual assault trial. The
court determined the case involved a conflict between
the religious rights of N.S., protected under s. 2 of
the Canadian Charter ofHuman Rights and Freedoms
(Charter) , and the s. 7 Charter rights of the accused
to a full and fair defense, which lead to an ambiguous
decision: that Muslim women could veil in court so
long as the presiding judge did not see that as an im-
pediment to the trial process. The very ambiguity of
the decision prompted legal commentary. Critics
have asserted that the decision will not permit wo-
men to veil in court, as most judges will deem that
the inability to see the face, and therefore to assess the
credibility of the witness, constitutes an impediment
to a fair trial and a full defence (Chambers and Roth
2014, 382) .
The case divided the court and sparked intense pub-
lic debate. Speaking for the majority in R. v. N.S. ,
Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin admitted that the
issue of “effective cross-examination and accurate as-
sessment of a witness’s credibility” was hotly disputed.
She asserted that “provisions of the Criminal Code …
and judicial pronouncements” presume that the
“ability to see a witness’s face is an important feature
of a fair trial” and that “this common law assumption
cannot be disregarded lightly” (R. v. N.S. , [2012] , 3
SCR 726, para 21 ) . Although she noted that “if …
women are required to remove the niqab while testi-
fying against their sincere religious belief they will be
reluctant to report offences and pursue their prosecu-
tion” (R. v. N.S. , [2012] , 3 SCR 726, para 37), she
also asserted that the interests of the accused and
“safeguarding the repute of the administration of
justice” were more compelling in this case since “no
less is at stake than an individual’s liberty” (R. v. N.S. ,
[2012] , 3 SCR 726, para 38) . Concurring, Canadian
Supreme Court Justices LeBel and Rothstein asked
whether wearing niqab in any trial was compatible
“with the constitutional values of openness and reli-
gious neutrality in contemporary democratic, but di-
verse, Canada” (R. v. N.S. , [2012] , 3 SCR 726, para
60) .
We found Islamophobia and Orientalist sexist dis-
course at the heart of the Majority’s decision and we
have argued that the decision ultimately legitimized
racist and sexist stereotypes that deny Muslim wo-
men’s full participation in Canadian society (Cham-
bers and Roth 2014, 386-389) . Only Justice Abella,
in dissent, considered the structural discrimination
the anonymized N.S. faced as a Muslim woman, and
asserted that “the harm to a complainant of requiring
her to remove her niqab while testifying will generally
outweigh any harm to trial fairness” (R. v. N.S. ,
[2012] , 3 SCR 726, para 86) . The majority found
that a judge would have to make a decision in each
individual case as to whether or not a niqab would be
allowed, and provided a framework for such decisions
(R. v. N.S. , [2012] , 3 SCR 726, para 38) . This ambi-
guity led to a large amount of online debate. For ex-
ample, in response to statements that the Supreme
Court should have prohibited the niqab in all cases to
protect Canada from “foreign ways,” one commenter
interjected: “Breaking news just now … : Supreme
Court of Canada KILLS Canada” (ArtisteNow
2012) . Another less acerbic writer added: “This is a
tough one, with sound Charter arguments on both
sides. It could go either way, and—whichever way
they rule—they’ll be wrong. // Glad I’m only a lowly
HuffPost commenter today, and not a Supreme
Court Justice” (Anonymous 2012) .
In online comments, people debated the decision and
its future application from their own perspectives on
human rights and the law, which provided a breadth
and depth of data we could draw on to illustrate how
postmodern and transversal feminist theory can be
applied to everyday encounters and personal trans-
formation. We examined discussions on three main-
stream Canadian media sites, Maclean’s Magazine,
Huffington Post, and the National Post, where the
most substantive and responsive commentary oc-
curred. These sites provided us with over 200 discus-
sion and comment entries from which to draw
examples of praxis in everyday interactions. Trans-
versal and postmodern feminism explain how dis-
cussants moved from positions of political opposition
to build peace, understanding, and bridges. Although
Atlantis Journal Issue 40.1 /2019 4
the discussants may or may not have deliberately
used feminist approaches in their attempts to re-
align oppressive attitudes—given the nature of on-
line discussion, it is impossible to know what people
do not divulge—it is clear that transversal and post-
modern feminist praxis, deliberately or unknowingly
brought into being, were at the heart of peace-build-
ing praxis.
The Political Context ofPersonal Posi-
tions: Islamophobia in the Economic
North
The oppressive binary of us/them identity politics
appeared in R. v. N.S. , in both the court’s decision
and the online debates; a brief contextualization of
the political context of the case is therefore useful. It
seems unnecessary to write that Muslims in non-
Muslim countries have faced increasing surveillance
and Islamophobia since 9/1 1 . We have no interest in
examining how Islamophobia is perpetuated online:
our focus is on feminist praxis in everyday encoun-
ters. We certainly join other cultural critics to de-
nounce Islamophobia as oppressive (see for example:
Arat-Koc 2005; Awan 2016; Cammaerts 2009; Carr
2016; Haque 2010; Kahn and Kellner 2004, 89, 93-
94; Love 2017, 83-1 16; and Razack 2008, 173) and
we recognize that the intersection of sexism and Is-
lamophobia produces particular outcomes. For ex-
ample, media reports from the United Kingdom
suggest Islamophobic violence is often gendered,
with women who veil in any way (hijab, niqab, or
burqa) bearing the brunt of verbal and physical at-
tacks (Vidal 2014; see also Perry 2014) . Many schol-
ars and activists have documented how veils have
become symbols of both the threat of fundamentalist
extremism and, paradoxically, women’s vulnerability
to abuse and subordination under purdah patriarch-
ies (see for example, McDonough 2003, 126-130;
and Simpson, James, and Mack 2011 ) .
In their brief to the Court in R. v. N.S. , for example,
the Canadian Council on American-Islamic Rela-
tions wrote: “[I] n popular discourse they [niqab-
wearing women] are either vilified as fanatics who
refuse to integrate, or infantilized as victims who are
prevented from seeing their own oppression” (qtd. in
Chambers and Roth 2014, 386) . LEAF, the Women’s
Legal Education and Action Fund in Canada, simil-
arly argued as intervenors in R. v. N.S. :
Although the small number of women who
wear the niqab in Canada are not a new phe-
nomenon, various national and international
events … have changed the political climate in
which they are viewed.… The niqab is per-
ceived as belonging to a culture/religion/value-
system which is stereotyped as extremist and
inimical to Western cultures and values. In this
context, the niqab has become emblematic of
an irreconcilable “clash of cultures.” (2013)
At the heart of “clashes of cultures” are the national
and individual identities people use to situate them-
selves, their nation, and their perceived nation-
al/identity values in relation to others. These
identity-based politics have proven difficult to over-
come, as Hill Collins points out (2017, 1471 ) , but
postmodern and transversal theories show how the
barriers created by entrenched identity politics can be
transformed through praxis into feminist outcomes.
Postmodern Feminism: Identity Permeabil-
ity and Feminist Praxis
As noted above, postmodernism challenges the tradi-
tional modern narratives about contained and care-
fully bounded identity-subjects. In the debates
produced by R. v. N.S. , the primary binaries invoked
were cultural: West/Non-West, Non-Muslim/Muslim,
Canadian/Foreigner, Liberated/Oppressed. That the
debates engendered by R. v. N.S. centred around the
question of controlling women’s bodies—what wo-
men are or are not allowed to wear—makes these de-
bates gendered. Like Homi Bhabha’s “third space”
(1994), online comments sections are liminal because
they require active identity production. They usually
lack the visual and aural signifiers that are often used
to produce identity, thus revealing that identity posi-
tions, including gender, are performative: they must
be named in an online space and are not inherent or
intrinsic (Lorber 2012, 284) . In our dataset, there is
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ample textual evidence of how people construct
themselves in relation to other nationalities or com-
munities, and in relation to those whom they perceive
to be, and define as, outsiders. As postmodern femin-
ist Judith Butler has argued, “bodies” are “a kind of
materialization governed by regulatory norms”; she
probes how the “materialization of the norm in body
formation produce[s] a domain of abjected bodies”
that are perceived to be “less-than” those who are
“normative” (Butler 1993, 15-16) . Critic Shahnaz
Khan has further argued that liminal third spaces are
places where contradictions in identity construction
can eschew colonial authority to produce postmod-
ern, transnational subjects who are more likely to re-
cognize the shared foreignness of identity positions
(1998) . At minimum, the online comments sections
in our dataset were places where multiple “authentic”
Canadian identities existed simultaneously, thus dis-
rupting any claims to one authentic cultural or na-
tional identity through the very existence of
pluralism.
This pluralism allowed the ideology of Canadian
multiculturalism to support a more fluid postmodern
identity. If not in practice, at least ideologically, mul-
ticultural Canada has the possibility to be plural,
porous, and encompassing. Since 1971 , Canada has
been formally multicultural and multiculturalism was
enshrined legally in the Charter ofHuman Rights and
Freedoms in 1982. In one definition, Canadian multi-
culturalism encourages and supports cultural plural-
ism, diversity, and equality for all. In practice, as
many critics have noted, it has been a political tool
aimed at social control and the containment of inter-
ethnic violence (see, for example, Allahar 1998, 340-
342) and is often used to silence cultural dissent by
obfuscating racist and xenophobic structures. Unfor-
tunately, therefore, in practice it usually creates a
“discourse of diversity” wherein those who are “mul-
ticultural … are merely … tolerated, but not accepted
as ‘real’ citizens” (James 2005, 19-20; see also Ban-
nerji 2000) . Thus, critics argue that multiculturalism
is an effective Eurocentric tool because it defines
people as being “multicultural” in relation to an in-
visible core group of “real” citizens who are, in
Canada, normalized to be of white British and
French settler descent (Jiwani 2006, 189; see also
Simpson, James, and Mack 2011 ) .
The multiculturalism invoked at the grassroots level
in our dataset, however, appealed to the ideal of Ca-
nadian multiculturalism: a society that seeks and re-
spects cultural diversity, that works against racism
and xenophobia, and that espouses the benefits of a
diverse community. As Anton Allahar writes, al-
though multiculturalism does little to address struc-
tural racism, “[w]here it works … multiculturalism is
a very effective form of resistance to racism” (1998,
338-339) . For Canada’s national identity construc-
tion, multiculturalism is the “Canadian Way”
(Driedger 1989, 238) and is often used to differenti-
ate Canada from the United States (Allahar 1998,
340) . When this form ofmulticulturalism is invoked,
it appeals to a Canadian identity that is not culturally
fixed, except insofar as it is culturally proliferous. The
challenges that multiculturalism has made to domin-
ant systems of authority and its connections to the
postmodern undermining of grand narratives have
been articulated in literary theory (see for example:
Caton 1997; Kamboureli 2007; Mohanty 1997; and
Poster 2009; and Yanyu 2004, among others) , which
argues that a cultural identity of multiply-located
cultures is democratisation that reflects the fluidity of
postmodern identities. This is not to say that identi-
fying permeability is the same as easily overcoming
racist structures. As Sarah Ahmed (2000) has warned,
permeability is easily “achievable for those whose ex-
periences of race are not lived as a barrier to entering
of even inhabiting certain spaces. For those who are
marginalised by the racial norm [of whiteness] , racial
identity means living with constraint and fixity” (58) .
It is the case, however, that multiculturalism was of-
ten invoked by commenters who identified as
Muslim and/or racialized in a call to the permeability
ofwhat it is to be Canadian.
Samira Kanji and Azeezah Kanji, for example, noted
in their National Post article that the Supreme Court
decision “provides a timely opportunity for some
much-needed reflection on the way we talk about the
Atlantis Journal Issue 40.1 /2019 6
niqab in Canada.” They call for “multicultural re-
spect” and cite s. 27 of the Charter which states that
rights must be “interpreted in a manner consistent
with the preservation and enhancement of the mul-
ticultural heritage” of Canada (2012) . Many others
argued similarly. In a debate that took place on
Huffington Post (HuffPost) , Nellie_Niqabi wrote: “I
demand respect because that’s what I have been
promised when I came here. … And by respect, I
mean having the freedom to dress the way I want,
and be myself” (2012a) . Overt Enigma asked of
readers: “What do you deem more important, pro-
tecting the charter of rights and freedoms and work-
ing with the communities to find a … solution, or
to embrace paranoia .. . and portray this one ruling
as the ‘end of times’” (2012b) . Brian 25 argued the
benefits of a culturally diverse Canada in his com-
ment back to right-wing journalist Barbara Kay’s
article in the National Post: “We are a multicultural
country where all cultures and traditions are equally
honored and respected. … You are stuck in the past
where Canadian meant western or European. It
doesn’t anymore. Today it means all cultures and tra-
ditions” (2012) . Cindy Zheng, commenting on
Mike Blanchfield’s Maclean’s article, similarly wrote:
“I think the court was wise to avoid a simple rule
that is a one-size-fits-all approach. Since we live in a
multi-cultural society, we must be prepared to ac-
commodate others, whether that be in the
courtroom or at the office” (2012) . And, in response
to novabird’s statement that Muslim women who
“do not wish to respect Canadian laws … can return
to their countries of origin” (2012) , Cindy V. asked,
“Where are they supposed to go if they were born in
Canada?” (2012) . These commenters draw on the
fluid, postmodern national identity of multicultural-
ism to argue for personal and political transforma-
tion.
In doing so, they eschewed a rigid, single definition
of “Canadian” in favour of cultural pluralism, and
thus embodied a liminal and postmodern worldview
where different cultural practices sit comfortably to-
gether. In such everyday political views, veiling was
often described as a choice made in a free and
democratic multicultural country. For example, Mike
T., in response to some commenters’ arguments that
allowing veiled women in court would change the
very nature of Canada, asked: “Where does it say ‘we’
have to change? No one is forcing anyone to change.
Where does it say that Canadian women HAVE to
wear the niqab while testifying. It’s a choice” (2012b) .
Similarly, Nicholas T adopted a comfortable post-
modern position in relation to national identity when
he wrote:
If you bothered to ask the women themselves,
you might find that they … wear the niqab by
choice. If so, to tell them they can’t wear one is
to take away their freedom to decide, and that
would be an act of oppression, would it not?
How is it any of your business to push your in-
terpretation on her and brand it as the accepted
‘Canadian’ one? (2012)
In support ofNicholas T, and in answer to arguments
that women who veil are oppressed, Nellie_Niqabi
responded that she feels “totally liberated,” and argued
that veiling allows women to be “judged” for their
minds, “not the way we look” (2013) .
For those who employed an everyday personal politics
of postmodern multiculturalism, the gendered aspect
of the case was important. Some commenters made
arguments for N.S.’s rights as a woman who must un-
veil in front of her alleged assailants after years of
sexual assault. Liz_Wilson_2 wondered “what is more
important in this situation, to prosecute the men that
have assaulted her—giving justice and access to legal
recourse for Islamic women in Canada or to force her
to appear unveiled?” (2012a) . Mike T. argued that the
context of the rape trial is important: “To force her to
figuratively disrobe in front of the alleged rapists is
really disturbing” (2012a) . Mike T.’s use of cultural
relativism (whether conscious or not) revealed the ef-
fects of postmodernism at work: disrobing was un-
derstood differently on the basis of cultural
differences. When novabird accused Mike T. of hy-
perbolizing because “[m]any thousands of North
American women face their accusers in court without
covering their faces” (2012) , they missed Mike T’s
point about postmodern cultural pluralism, which he
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reiterated: the women who appear unveiled in court,
he responded, have “been brought up in an atmo-
sphere where showing their face is a normal, everyday
happening. This woman wasn’t. It’s just a basic hu-
man kindness to a traumatized woman” (2012c) .
Other responses to novabird’s position that women
must unveil in court also reveal the strength of post-
modern multiculturalism in relation to the law.
RK2880 wrote, “Read the decision—according to
Canadian law, wearing a niqab IS acceptable. Women
who wear it while testifying are respecting Canadian
laws” (2012) . Overt Enigma argued: “Forcing any
group of people to conform to your understanding
and system of values is contrary to multiculturalism,
tolerance and the values upon which Canada was
founded” (2012a) . Although Torontosaurous de-
nounced veiling in general, he also wrote, “[f] rom a
legal stand point [sic] ,as [sic] long as the judge rules
that this is indeed the woman that is the accuser,and
[sic] not an imposter,and [sic] those charged agree
that the woman is who she says she is,I [sic] see no
problem” (2012a) . All of these commenters’ argu-
ments illustrate a strong, if unconscious, commitment
to postmodernity: in order for them to make claims
that Canadians occupy multiple, relative, cultures,
they must adopt a comfortable postmodern position
in which national identity is permeable and diverse.
That they do so in order to defend a woman’s right to
dress as she chooses illustrates that postmodern fem-
inist praxis can be found in unlikely places. It is not
apparent that any of the commenters were con-
sciously working from a position of feminist politics,
which is our point: there are hopeful signs of cultural
change in this wider appearance of what is very likely
unconscious postmodern feminist praxis. While some
commenters did not immediately espouse a postmod-
ern view and began their discussion with a fixed,
bounded definition of what it is to be “Canadian,”
when they changed their view, their changes can be
explained by transversal feminist praxis: the process
that allows the movement from a fixed to a permeable
identity and which is closely connected to the post-
modern aims of complicating identity politics. As Pa-
tricia Hill Collins argues, “analysis is important, yet
action also matters,” and “transversal politics [is] a
form of political engagement that ha[s] important
implications for understanding organized political
resistance” (2017, 1467) .
Postmodern Theory to Transversal Praxis:
Rooting and Shifting
In our study, transformations in people’s personal
political views often occurred when discussants made
empathetic connections between Islamophobic op-
pression and their own experiences, leading them to
articulate similarly-held Outsider positions. This
moved them from a fixed identity position to post-
modern permeability, and on to transversal praxis.
Nira Yuval-Davis, arguably the most prolific writer on
transversal praxis, explains that transversal politics
“developed as an alternative to the assimilationist
‘universalistic’ politics of the Left, on the one hand,
and to identity politics, on the other hand” (2006,
281 ) . Transversal feminism is “dialogical standpoint
epistemology … a recognition that from each posi-
tioning the world is seen differently, and thus any
knowledge based on just one positioning is ‘unfin-
ished’” (2006, 281 ; see also Harding 1991 ; and Sto-
etzler and Yuval-Davis 2002) . Like postmodernism,
transversal feminism recognizes that identities are
complex:
People who identify themselves as belonging to
the same collectivity or social category can ac-
tually be positioned very differently in relation
to a whole range of social locations (e.g., class,
gender, ability, sexuality, stage in life cycle) . At
the same time, people with similar positionings
and/or identities can have very different social
and political values. (Yuval-Davis 2006, 281 ;
see also Yuval-Davis 1994, 1997, and Yuval-
Davis and Stoetzler 2002)
Recently, Patricia Hill Collins reflected on her 1998
article “The Tie that Binds,” where she argued that
combating race-based violence required “a more
sophisticated transversal politics that took intersecting
power relations into account,” because “intersectional
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analyses, on their own, are unlikely to yield … effect-
ive political solutions to violence” (2017, 1460-61 ) .
She noted that “action matters … transversal politics
[is] a form of political engagement that [has] import-
ant implications for understanding organized politic-
al resistance” (2017, 1467) . Drawing on the work of
Yuval-Davis, Hill Collins examines coalition-building
within and outside of historically constructed group
identities (2017, 1469-72) and argues that the Black
Lives Matter movement shows how the “flexible
solidarity honed through Black women’s politics” can
work with “transversal politics as a framework for co-
alitions among groups that inform anti-violence initi-
atives” (2017, 1471 ) .
Coalition building is important: as Yuval-Davis poin-
ted out, the result of mid-twentieth century hege-
monic constructions of feminist politics was “identity
politics.” From an intersectional perspective, the con-
structions of anti-racist politics in the civil rights
movement shared the same outcomes (see also
Moghadam 1994). Yuval-Davis explains that
in such politics all the members of the op-
pressed social category are constructed as ho-
mogenous; all dimensions of social location are
reduced into the primary one. Thus there is no
differentiation in this approach between cat-
egorical locations, social identities, and politic-
al values … identity politics conflates
individual and collective identities, therefore
assuming that any member of any social cat-
egory or identity can speak for all the other
members of that category … “as a woman,” “as
a black,” and so forth. (2006, 277)
She argues that early corrections of the gender hege-
mony in the mainstream feminist movement only
continued to reify essentialist constructions of iden-
tity by simply fragmenting and multiplying
descriptors: i.e. “as a disabled woman,” “as a lesbian
Asian,” etc., “rather than a rejection of that model of
identity politics itself” (2006, 278, 281 ) . Integrative
feminist analysis, formed contemporaneously with
poststructuralist and postmodern feminist theories,
tries to address the fragmentation produced by iden-
tity politics’ essentialism (Yuval-Davis 2006, 278) .
Transversal feminism has been used effectively for co-
alition-building between different women’s groups
(see Yuval-Davis 1994, 2002) because in taking a dia-
logical standpoint people no longer “speak for” their
constituencies in an essentializing way but are rather
messengers engaged in political dialogue, bringing
with them “the reflective knowledge of their own po-
sitioning and identity. This is the rooting” (Yuval-
Davis 2006, 282) . Rooting, the first stage in trans-
versal feminist practice, is when participants do the
deep work of thinking about their own identity posi-
tions—how they define themselves—and recognize
that they cannot speak in an essentializing way “as
a…” due to the complexity of intersectionality; rather,
they bring partial knowledge from their own complex
positions. The second stage in transversal feminist
practice is shifting: when participants “put themselves
in the situation of those with whom they are in dia-
logue and who are different from them” (Yuval-Davis
2006, 282) . Transversal feminism assumes that people
are capable of empathy and that the shifting process
involves a careful examination of the “compatible val-
ues” that “cut across differences in positionings and
identities” (2006, 282) . As Yuval-Davis points out,
“[t] he struggle against oppression and discrimination
might (and mostly does) have a specific categorical
focus, but it is never confined just to that category”
(2006, 282) . For example, when Hill Collins writes
about the transversal roots of the success of the Black
Lives Matter movement (2017, 1471 ) and argues for
the need to move towards transversal political action
in more meaningful ways, she describes how multiple
groups came to align themselves with the Black Lives
Matter movement.
Hill Collins argues that transversal politics is the ne-
cessary but “as yet unrealized future” of political act-
ivism (2017, 1471 ) . The challenge, in terms of praxis,
is likely that, on the one hand, decades of feminist
and other critical evidence has shown that identities
like sex, race, and class, are social constructions and
therefore “false:” there is no natural, biologically-de-
termined identity to embody. Further, experts have
shown that these identities have been, and are, im-
posed through relations of power and domination
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(the extensive and “scientific” Imperial classification
and invention of different races in the nineteenth
century is an example, see for example Hill Collins
1998; hooks 1989; Lorde 1984; and McClintock
1995) . For this reason, postmodern, transversal, post-
structuralist, and intersectional feminist theorists ar-
gue that equality can be pursued by showing how the
false hegemonic binaries of male/female, white/black,
straight/gay, etc. crumble under scrutiny.
However, on the other hand, the constructed “false-
ness” of hegemonic identities exists alongside the ma-
terial lived effects of those constructions so that
decades of evidence in feminist and other critical dis-
ciplines also shows that statements like “women are
the majority of victims of spousal abuse” and “Indi-
genous women in Canada are more likely to suffer
sexual violence than non-Indigenous women” are not
only valid but, in a society of inequalities created by
false binaries, they are also politically expedient and
necessary (see, for example, Butler 1993, 1 -23) . Soci-
ety is not yet in a position where it is simply a matter
of recognizing the falseness of either/or identity con-
struction and its historical connections to power rela-
tions and domination to dissolve inequality. Identities
remain important and this, perhaps, is why Hill
Collins (2017) writes that the future possibilities
provided by transversal feminism are as yet unmet.
Similarly, Yuval-Davis has pointed out that transversal
feminist practice is difficult because both the rooting
and shifting stages need to remain fluid, not “straight-
forward or fixed” (2006, 284) . The purpose of root-
ing in one’s identity is “not to imagine oneself just in
relation to the social category of the Other but also in
other ways through which different kinds of relation-
ships with the partners in the transversal dialogue
may be developed” (2006, 284) . Hill Collins notes
that “the process of shifting must maintain the multi-
plicity of perspectives both within a group and across
groups. This is the difficult challenge, one that recog-
nizes that some coalitions may not be possible” (2017,
1470) . Despite the difficulties, however, many mo-
ments of transformation in online commenters’ polit-
ical views illustrate transversal feminist praxis in
process. Both Yuval-Davis and Hill Collins argue that
intersectionality provides multiple identity meeting
points (roots) from which people can connect and
shift. For many in Canada, one shared identity point
is that of settler.
When commenter rattler wrote that a “creeping ac-
ceptance of cultures alien to Canada has reached a
saturation point. . . . The [immigration] ‘welcome’ mat
is no longer at my door” (2012) , for example, Yasmin
responded: “I’m sure the First People would agree
with you, and would be more than happy to help you
pack your goods so that you can move back to
Europe. Alien culture indeed” (2012) . Yasmin invokes
rattler’s shared otherness with women who veil as a
non-Indigenous settler, suggesting that rattler’s per-
ceived right to be in Canada should extend to Muslim
Canadians who are, similarly, settlers on someone
else’s lands. Julia Kristeva’s now-germinal work on the
construction of foreignness is helpful here: Kristeva
(1991 ) argued that “the foreigner” is formally one
who holds a different nationality. In Canada, transna-
tional politics and identity formations produce mul-
tiple “foreign” identities (e.g., African American,
Italian-Canadian) . This holds true even in the dis-
cursive construction of First Peoples, who are often
represented as “ethnicized” in relation to white settlers
to support the myth of white indigeneity and entitle-
ment to the land (see for example Bohaker and Iacov-
etta 2009) . Kristeva argued that postmodern
identities allow for multiple points of recognition be-
cause we are no longer “fixed” in terms of the rela-
tionships between nation-state and self, thus
illustrating the link between postmodernism and
transversal praxis: when people recognize shared for-
eignness, outsiders cease to exist because all become
outsiders (1991 , 96) .
Sara Ahmed’s (2000) work on “the stranger” similarly
notes that the stranger is both “familiar and strange”
because of their “proximity.” The stranger’s very posi-
tioning in a shared space is what produces people as
strangers in the first place: “[T]he strangers come to
be seen as figures (with linguistic and bodily integrity)
when they have entered the spaces we call ‘home’”
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(49) . In this sense, all non-Indigenous Canadians
have, at one time or another, occupied the position
of stranger who becomes incorporated into the home
lands (50) . In our study, the shared identity location
of settler-Outsider was often invoked by commenters
to try to create moments of connection across iden-
tity locations, a move that reflects transversal praxis’
deliberate rooting and shifting.
For example, Nellie_Niqabi shared why she veils and
her unhappiness with a society that treats her as a
foreigner. Her language suggested she was upset
when she wrote that “these brainwashed masses are
trying to teach us what our religious requirements
are. They are trying to ‘liberate’ us by passing us
snide comments in public and and [sic] trying to tug
our veils off. … The impression that all women who
wear the veil are oppressed is completely stereotype”
(2012a) . Mike_in_Ottawa responded with a trans-
versal shift: he recognized and named their shared
settler identity boundary and moved the conversation
towards empathy and coalition-building:
Nellie, I have an issue with your statement “I
demand respect because that’s what I have
been promised when I came here.” My family
were immigrants to this country as well. They
didn’t demand respect and Italians were looked
down upon for years in this country. We
earned respect through hard work and becom-
ing Canadian…. Be patient and the respect
and understanding will come. (2012)
In response, Nellie_Niqabi’s tone becomes more con-
versational. She thanks Mike_in_Ottawa for being
“understanding” and “open minded,” and acknow-
ledges that “respect won’t come on demand” but she
also continues to name her experience with Islamo-
phobia as different from that of Mike’s Italian-Cana-
dian heritage. She writes that anti-veiling attitudes
are not “the same thing as another race or another
culture. … For us, we have no reason not to have re-
spect. We do contribute to society. Our face veils
don’t really make a difference. It isn’t that the Niqab
is new here [as Mike_in_Ottawa suggested] . It’s a
whole different thing.” She hopes, in her final sen-
tence directed at Mike, “that someday, people might
look at Niqabi women as people, and not as symbols
of oppression :)” (2012b) . Nellie_Niqabi’s change in
tone from argument to discussion, and her smiley
emoticon illustrates a shift towards negotiation and
understanding.
Establishing a shared identity location also led to res-
olution in an argument on HuffPost: Janice_Rosen
called for a Canadian nation-state that rejects its past
racist practices, such as the internment of Japanese-
Canadians during World War II, and which instead
shows “[f] lexibility and understanding and a willing-
ness to extend this understanding to cultural differ-
ences” (2012) . In response, AlisonCarnie, who had
initially posted “[t] his is Canada … adapt or go
home” (2012a) , writes “I was wrong and you are right
… you explained it brilliantly.” AlisonCarnie went on
to disclose: “I dated a man in the 1970s in Toronto
whose parents were born in Vancouver and were of
Japanese descent … they were in an internment camp
during WWII … not one of Canada’s proudest mo-
ments” (2012b) . AlisonCarnie’s turn to her past ex-
perience, directly after an admittance of
wrong-thinking, illustrates that her attitudinal shift
was related to her own close personal relationship
with someone who had experienced the negative ef-
fects of being treated as an outsider. One aspect of her
identity (former girlfriend of Japanese Canadian man)
allowed her to find a common link and move to em-
pathy and transformation.
Adding to Kristeva’s theories about shared outsider
status, a number of theorists suggest that building in-
terpersonal connections can move people to better
understand others’ experiences, part of the rooting
process in transversal politics. In her exploration of
the tensions between white and racialized women’s
coalition building, María Lugones (1983) notes:
[T]he only motive that makes sense to me for
your [privileged women] joining us … is the
motive of friendship. … I see the “out of
friendship” as the only sensical motivation for
this … because the task at hand for you is one
of extraordinary difficulty. … I do not think
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that you have any obligation to understand us.
You do not have an obligation to abandon your
imperialism, your universal claims, you reduc-
tion ofus to your selves. (576)
Both Lugones and Elizabeth Spelman, with whom
she writes, articulate the importance of dialogue that
undoes insider/outsider binaries:
At first sight it may appear that the in-
sider/outsider distinction disappears in the dia-
logue, but it is important to notice that all that
happens is that we are now both outsider and
insider with respect to each other. The dialogue
puts us both in position to give a better ac-
count of each other’s and our own experience.
(1983, 577)
Self-interest or a sense of obligation does not engage
members of a dominant group in others’ struggles
long-term. Personal connection, “the motive of
friendship,” is “both the only appropriate and under-
standable motive for” the dominant group, they ar-
gue: “[Y]ou may be moved by friendship to undergo
the very difficult task of understanding the text of our
cultures by understanding our lives.… This learning
calls for circumspection, for questioning of yourselves
and your roles in your own culture” (1983, 581 ) ,
which is the process of rooting, and of recognizing
the many ways that we, individually, might define
ourselves.
Although identity-markers are often cited in feminist
intersectional scholarship as race, gender, class, ability,
age, etc., they can and do encompass a number of
ways that individuals identify themselves, including
more mundane connections such as links to popular
culture. One such example in our dataset illustrated
that, in rooting, there are many ways to make con-
nections and shift. When Liz_Wilson_2 wondered
“what is more important in this situation, to prosec-
ute the men that have assaulted her—giving justice
and access to legal recourse for Islamic women in
Canada or to force her to appear unveiled” (2012a) ,
Gerry K. initially responded:
If they allow this then it sets a precedent.
Should we let religious beliefs push back Cana-
dian law? What’s next … Jedi was recently ac-
credited as a recognized religion, what if they
say they can’t testify without light sabres on the
stand, or their Yoda puppets? Where is the line
drawn? (2012a)
Instead of a counter-attack, Liz_Wilson_2 writes:
“How did you know I had a light saber and a puppet
:o)” (2012b) . She then again shares her concern “that
this is also a way of intimidating this particular wo-
man and could result in her choosing not to testify or
to be so uncomfortable that her testimony is affected”
(2012b) . Commenter Dipl added in response to
Gerry K.: “[I] f Yoda you wish on your legal team, sit
he must at the counsel table” (2012) , mimicking
Yoda’s speech syntax. The identity marker shared by
these commenters is that of Star Wars fan: all three
commenters know enough about the Star Wars fran-
chise, and its relation to cultural movements like the
Jedi religion in the UK, to make playful gestures to-
wards it. Rooting out this shared identity marker pro-
duced a shift in Gerry K.’s tone and view: “I agree,
and I really hope this is not an intimidation tactic”
(2012b) . This example points to the fluidity Yuval-
Davis argues is required when rooting to find a shared
point of contact with those positioned in opposition.
If rooting produces identity considerations that are
embedded only in Black/White, straight/gay,
man/woman, young/old, etc., then it is still simply
“recognizing the self via the relationship with the sig-
nificant Other,” whereas “the whole point of trans-
versal politics is to transcend the binary divisions of
those who are in different positionings in the dia-
logue” (Yuval-Davis 2006, 284) . The Jedi-based hu-
mour used by the Star Wars fans in this particular
example illustrates that rooting and shifting can be
playfully serious work.
The work ofKristeva, Spelman and Lugones, Ahmed,
and transversal feminism moves away from the iden-
tity-based essentialism that leads to political infight-
ing and towards adopting dialogic standpoint bridge
building between groups and individuals. This work
explains why the transformations that happened dur-
ing the online discussions in our dataset are examples
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of transversal praxis in practice and effect, if not in-
tent. Transversal feminist theorists have heralded the
efficacy of “dialogic” consciousness-raising and anti-
oppressive work “as a means of creating difference-
and diversity-sensitive feminist solidarity across na-
tional and regional borders” (Lykke 2004, 75; see also
Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis 2002, 315-35; Yuval-Davis
1997; Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler 2002) . That work
was apparent in our dataset when some commenters
made connections between their own lives and the
lives of others, whether those connections were made
consciously or not.
Conclusion: Postmodern and Transversal
Theory and Conflict Resolution
Feminist praxis is conceived of as a deliberate process,
both in research and in personal development (see
Hesse-Biber 2012) . Sumi Cho, Kimberlé Crenshaw,
and Leslie McCall, for example, outline three ap-
proaches to achieve intersectional feminist praxis.
Elizabeth Evans notes that making the “transition
from theory to practice” is a process of “application”
(2016, 68) . Elizabeth Sharp et al. (2017) recount how
their work translates “scholarship to action” (76) be-
cause they were intentionally “guided by feminist
praxis” to move from “frustration and anger into ac-
tion” (80) . Similarly, Katherine Allen (2000), and Lee
Ann De Reus, April Few, and Libby Balter Blume
(2005) note that praxis is the process of putting the-
ory into action. Nancy Naples, in her reflections on
the transformation of political theory into everyday
politics, notes that “feminist praxis incorporates a
commitment to self-reflexivity” that is necessary to
transform experience into knowledge (2013, 659-
661 ) . While feminist praxis does rely on reflexive and
conscious transformation, which could explain why,
given the tenacity of identity politics, Hill Collins
(2017) noted that transversal feminist praxis is not
yet met, we found evidence in our dataset that people
can and do transform their everyday politics through
the processes of rooting and shifting identified by
transversal feminism, even if they are not consciously
doing so.
These moments would not be possible without the
permeability of postmodern identity positions. In her
work, connecting Donna Haraway’s postmodernism
to transversal theory, Michelle Bastian points out that
postmodern subjects are better able to reach points of
empathy and respect than the fixed subject of mod-
ernity; that is, postmodern subjects are better able to
engage in transversal praxis. Bastian draws attention
to Haraway’s argument that identity “is always con-
structed and stitched together imperfectly and there-
fore able to join with another, to see together without
claiming the other” (qtd. in Bastian 2006, 1040) . The
everyday politics of identity work that took place
when discussants recognized that their own identities
were permeable and which allowed them to “join with
another, to see together” diversely and move towards
understanding, empathy, and resolution are examples
of transversal praxis in action (also see Pryse 2000,
108-9) . These transformations led discussants to “dis-
mantl[e] the systems that maintain group antagon-
isms” (Bastian 2006, 1040), like the Islamophobia
that was embedded in, and which surrounded, the R.
v. N.S. decision.
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